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Foot and Mouth Disease

Briefing


Foot and Mouth Disease

Foot and Mouth Disease


The foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) virus can infect nearly 70 species of mammals. In cattle the disease can cause a fever and blistering lesions on the mouth, tongue, muzzle, hooves and udder. The blisters lead to salivation and lameness as well as secondary infection. In young animals there can be effects on the heart (myocarditis) and this may lead to death. In pigs, the illness is of similar severity and is most serious for young animals. Goats and sheep are less affected.

According to the International Office of Epizootics (animal diseases) FMD is a 'List A' notifiable disease. In the UK it was first reported in 1839, but was largely ignored because it was considered to be a mild disease in comparison to other animal diseases common at the time. In fact it was another thirty years before any attempt was made to control it, and these moves were widely opposed at the time because they were considered to be unnecessary[1]. Questions remain as to whether the seriousness of this disease warrants the extreme response it provokes.

FMD virus has distinct types (O, A, C, SAT), and within these there are strains responding to the geographical area in which the virus is found. So, type O virus has at least 6 distinct strains - European/South American; East Africa; South Asia; South East Asia; China/Hongkong; Indonesia. The 1967 FMD epidemic in the UK was caused by the European strain of the type O virus, originally exported to South America from Europe in the 1870s and then returned to Europe in the 1960s[2].

FMD virus in the UK
The virus causing the UK epidemic is a strain of the type O virus, referred to as Pan-Asia. It is a pandemic causing strain (extremely infectious)[3]. It was first identified in northern India in 1990 and has been spreading steadily westwards towards Europe and east towards South East Asia since then. It has appeared in countries that had previously been free of FMD for many years. In 2000, the UN's Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) put out a warning about it, and it was confirmed in Cambodia, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates[4].

The severity of symptoms in animals contracting this particular strain of FMD, have been different in different countries. For example, it caused very high lamb mortality in Iran but almost no symptoms in cattle in China[5]. In the UK one of the problems in tracing the disease has been the fact that many infected sheep have not shown any symptoms at all. According to the Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food (MAFF) only 5 per cent of sheep in infected flocks have been displaying symptoms, and these may be brief in duration[6].

Carriers
The incubation period for FMD is 2-21 days (average 3-8), during which time the infected animals can spread the virus. But once the animal's immune system starts to tackle the virus (around 4 to 5 days after infection) the amount of virus excreted by the animal starts to fall rapidly[7].

Pigs can be infected by eating infected food. Cattle and sheep are mainly infected by inhaling the virus. Pigs breathe out large amounts of virus into the air which can then spread to other livestock.

Recovered cattle may carry the virus for 18 to 24 months; sheep for 1 to 2 months. Pigs are not carriers. However, there is little evidence that cattle carrying the virus after infection will actually infect other livestock - experimental evidence has only shown successful transmission of the disease up to 8 days after the end of clinical symptoms[8]. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has conducted an analysis of those animals which pose high, moderate or low risk as sources (transmission) of the virus[9]. Animals found in the UK rank as follows:

USDA Risk rating for transmission Animal
high cattle; goat; sheep; domestic pig; human; deer; fox; rat; hedgehog; starling; house fly; tick
moderate feral pig/wild boar; mouse; grey squirrel;
low rabbit

Causes of Foot and Mouth outbreaks

Since 1945 there have been two major epidemics of FMD in the UK, in 1952-54 and 1967. According to the European Commission[10], of the cases of FMD in the European Union (EU) between 1977 and 1987, 8 were connected to meat/animal imports, 13 were possibly associated with escape of the virus from laboratories and/or the use of improperly inactivated vaccine. The source of the rest was unknown. The USDA conducted a study of 880 primary outbreaks of FMD reported worldwide between 1870 and 1993. Of those for which the source was known, nearly 66 per cent were associated with FMD virus contaminated meat or meat products or waste; 22 per cent were linked to airborne transmission or birds; 6 per cent to imported livestock; 4 per cent to contaminated objects or people; and 3 per cent to vaccines[11]. Only three cases worldwide were linked to infection from wildlife, two in Africa and one possible case in Russia.
Globalisation
Various national and international agencies have warned about the increasing risk of livestock disease epidemics

because of increasing animal trading:
* According to the USDA, the risk of FMD outbreaks has increased because of “Increased trade, decreased transit time of animals and animal products, and changes in sanitary standards”[12].

* In 1998, the United Nations FAO warned that Europe was especially vulnerable to livestock diseases because of the large scale of animal movements within the EU as well as the high density, even overcrowding, of animals on European farms[13].

* In 1999, the EU Scientific Committee on Animal Health and Animal Welfare stated that the EU was at “extraordinarily high” risk of FMD because of the presence of FMD in countries on the edge of the EU (eg Turkey). Ironically, this outbreak has come through the UK, which has no borders with countries in which FMD is present.

* An article by scientists from the Italian Public Health Ministry[14] stated that “Changes in the livestock industry, such as the rapid transportation of animals over long distances, and the concentration of livestock in large intensive units, are conducive to outbreaks of exotic diseases which can occur unexpectedly”

Since 1993, Northern Ireland has seen the reintroduction of five poultry diseases which had previously been eradicated[15]. The Globalisation and intensification of agriculture has led to an increased risk and increasing frequency of livestock disease epidemics.

Causes of the spread of Foot and Mouth

FMD is spread mainly by animal-to-animal contact, or by humans acting as carriers. But even if the movements of animals and humans are controlled, the disease can be spread by the wind. Airborne spread appeared to play an important role in the 1967-1968 outbreak[16] and the disease has been shown to travel up to 60 km over land, and 250km over water[17]. But it is reported that pigs release the largest quantities of virus into the air,followed by cattle and then sheep. In this outbreak, there have been relatively few outbreaks of FMD in pigs and so the windborne risk may be lower than in 1967.

Risk Factors
Following a serious outbreak of swine fever in the Netherlands in 1997, an analysis of disease spread was conducted by the Dutch government[18]. Factors which emerged as being extremely important included:

The length of the period after infection but before detection.
In this period, a disease may be spread widely - as has happened in the UK FMD outbreak. Measures suggested by the Dutch government included: education for farmers and vets to recognise diseases; improved monitoring systems for earlier detection eg systematic blood sampling at abattoirs.

Animal movements
The number of animal contacts prior to detection determines how widely the disease will spread. Measures taken in the Netherlands to reduce such contacts included incentives for farmers to 'close' their herd system. They are encouraged to move animals around as little as possible. Farmers whose animals were not properly recorded, identified and traceable were not eligible for compensation if their herd had to be destroyed.

In the case of the current outbreak, there were a large number of long distance movements of sheep in the period after infection but before detection. According to MAFF, sheep from one of the first farms to be infected were sent to market in Hexham on 13 February. Within two weeks, infected sheep had travelled to markets in Cumbria, Wales, Hereford, Northampton and Ross-on- Wye as well as to dealers in Devon, Scotland and Cheshire[19]

Control of Foot and Mouth - 'Stamping Out'

When FMD first appeared in the UK in the mid 19th century, there was little attempt to control it and animals were treated if they became ill[20] However, there is now very little emphasis on treatment, and all efforts are directed at eradication and control of outbreaks.
There are two methods for controlling FMD - one method is to use vaccination and the other is the slaughtering of all infected animals, referred to as 'stamping out'. EU Directives base control of the disease on 'stamping out' - killing and disposal of infected animals. Additionally, there are movement controls for animals, meat products, humans and vehicles which could be carrying the virus.

The slaughter policy for FMD was developed in the late 1880s. This was the only option available at a time when vaccines did not exist, and it has remained in place because vaccines have until recently been fairly unreliable. In addition, it was considered that the costs of controlling occasional outbreaks of foot and mouth disease would be far less than the costs of routine vaccination of large numbers of animals every year.

Stamping out is used around the world for the control of foot and mouth disease. Animals found to have the disease are immediately killed and their bodies disposed of. Animals immediately next to the infected premises are also killed ('ring culling'), as well as those which have had contact with the infected livestock. This happens whether or not they show symptoms, in order to prevent the disease spreading. In the case of a small and limited outbreak, this can be an effective means of preventing the disease getting a foothold, but in the case of a large outbreak, such as that in the UK, it becomes an enormous and difficult task.

In the late 1980s, animal disease policies were a major obstacle to animal trade within the EU. The UK, Denmark, Ireland and Greece relied entirely on stamping out for FMD control, while other member states used a combination of vaccination and limited cull. This meant that four countries were barring entry of meat from other EU states[21]. In 1991, as a result of UK lobbying, vaccination was abandoned for FMD control throughout the EU. The Dutch government is in favour of a review of this EU policy[22].

During the current outbreak, it became clear early on that FMD had spread very widely. In a attempt to stop further spread the MAFF instigated a policy of pre- emptive culling of large numbers of animals: all sheep and pigs within a 3 km radius of each outbreak in Cumbria, as well as all sheep that had come into contact with sheep sold through markets at Welshpool, Northampton and Longtown. By 9 April, over 1.3 million animals had been slaughtered or identified for slaughter[23], this is more than double the number killedin the whole of the 1967 outbreak.

The Small and Family Farmers Alliance has estimated that if the worst case prediction of 4,500 FMD cases by June actually happens, then the slaughter policy will mean that over 20 million animals would have to be killed - over one third of all livestock in the UK[24]. In the 1922 and 1954 outbreaks, over one third of cattle in Cheshire were slaughtered. At the time, farmers argued that the only reason the disease came under control was because there were no longer any animals to infect[25]. Historical evidence also shows that the slaughter policy does not provide a quick solution to Foot and Mouth disease - the 1922 and 1952 outbreaks both lasted for 2 years and the 1967 outbreak took eight months to bring under control.
Movement restrictions on animals means that they cannot be moved to new pastures or to housing during lambing. The RSPCA has reported animals in poor conditions or running short of food because of the movement restrictions[26]. This has led to large numbers of animals in infected areas being culled for 'welfare reasons' - by the 6th of April there were 1.5 million animals earmarked for slaughter for this reason.

Control of Foot and Mouth - Vaccination

EU Council Directive 90/423 recognises that stamping out may not always be effective at controlling FMD and therefore provides for emergency vaccination of livestock in the event of an epidemic of the disease. All EU member states are required to have contingency plans in place in case there is an outbreak of FMD. According to MAFF, the UK's contingency plan was last updated in 2000[27].

The current Foot and Mouth epidemic is unique in Europe. The disease is spreading from many centres and may have been around for longer than MAFF first thought, or at any rate than has been publicly admitted. This situation has split opinion in the veterinary profession and the practical farming community. The Government needs to make a judgement based on conflicting advice and communicate its decision and reasons for the decision quickly and clearly. There are three different types of vaccination to consider:


Routine vaccination
.
This is used by countries where FMD is endemic and the purpose is to generate herd immunity -ie. too few animals in the population are susceptible to allow an epidemic. On 23 March, the European Commission restated its opposition to routine vaccination for FMD[28].

Emergency 'dampening' vaccination.
This could be used in an area where the disease is spreading very rapidly, and it is not possible to slaughter animals quickly enough to prevent its spread by wind to other areas. The purpose of vaccination is to reduce the number of animals acting as a reservoir of the disease within the infected zone. The animals vaccinated are those close to, or within, the infected area and they are later slaughtered.

Emergency 'protective' vaccination.
This is also referred to as ring vaccination. Animals are vaccinated in a ring around an outbreak area, in order to create an 'immune' belt around the infected area. Using this strategy, animals are only vaccinated if they are outside the current 'at risk' area - in other words they are too far away from the current area of the disease to be at risk of contracting it[29]. The inoculated animals then act as a 'fire break' against the disease spreading further. Cattle are given priority for vaccination as they are most at risk of contracting the disease from the windborne virus. While these animals do not have to be slaughtered, they cannot be moved outside of the vaccination zone and the sale of meat and milk products are subject to restrictions.

In a simulation conducted by the Canadian government in 2000, it was found that an outbreak of FMD could only be controlled by ring vaccination, as the stamping out policy failed to contain the disease[30].

Trade restrictions on vaccinated animals are in place because of concerns that some vaccinated animals can still contract the disease and so act as carriers. However, there is now a test which can tell the difference between animals that have been vaccinated and infected animals.

Animals which have been vaccinated produce slightly different antibodies compared to those that have been infected. This test could be used to 'clear' an animal population of FMD after an emergency vaccination programme[31]. Vaccination in the UK
In 1999, the Scientific Committee on Animal Health and Animal Welfare developed a policy for the use of emergency vaccination in the EU in the event of an FMD outbreak[32]. The strategy provides criteria by which it can be decided whether a vaccination policy should be adopted. As can be seen from the following table, most of these criteria are met in the current outbreak.

Criteria For vaccination Against vaccination
Population density of susceptible animals
High Low
Clinically affected species
Significant number of pigs
involved
Predominantl y ruminants
Movement of potentially
infected animals or products
out of the protection zone
Evidence No evidence
Predicted airborne spread of
virus from infected premises
High Low or absent
Suitable vaccine Available Not available
Origin of outbreaks
(traceability)
Unknown Known
Incidence slope of outbreaks Rising rapidly Shallow or slow rise
Distribution of outbreaks Widespread Restricted
Public reaction to total
stamping out policy
Strong Weak
Acceptance of regionalisation
after vaccination
Yes No

The EU as a whole maintains an antigen bank of FMD vaccine, and currently holds 8.5 million doses of vaccine for the O strain of the virus[33].

In the case of the current epidemic, the Netherlands has applied for permission to use suppressive vaccination if
necessary, while the UK has permission to use protective vaccination to limit the slaughter of animals in Cumbria and Devon[34]. If put into operation, the proposal is that 180,000 cattle would be vaccinated. This would be identified on their passports and they would not be able to be moved from the vaccination zones for more than one year after the last outbreak in that area and never toany other member states. Milk would have to be pasteurised and only deboned, mature meat could be sold from these animals. This vaccination would also prolong the general trade restrictions on the UK.

Organisations involved in farming or representing farmers have been split by the issue of vaccination. The National Farmers Union has consistently opposed it, while the Small and Family Farmers Alliance, the Soil Association and the National Trust have all called for vaccination. The RSPCA are not supporting vaccination on the grounds that there is no evidence it will work and English Nature are not supporting the vaccination of hill sheep at present. The Government has not said why it is not taking up the option for vaccination, beyond stating the desire for the UK to return to the status of foot and mouth free area. This is clearly not a satisfactory position given that the EU has already sanctioned the limited use of vaccine in the UK.

Disposal of Carcasses

Apart from the obvious psychological effects of burning pyres in infected areas, there are serious environmental concerns. The Environment Agency has responsibility for establishing which means of disposal for culled livestock carcasses is acceptable. One of their main concerns is the breakdown products of buried carcasses will leach into water supplies and aquifers. These include ammonia, chlorides, phosphates, organic compounds, bacteria and metals (eg zinc and copper from pigs). The Agency has developed a hierarchy of preferences for disposal based on the effectiveness at destroying the virus and minimising effects on the environment[35]:
1. rendering at a rendering plant
2. incineration at an incinerator
3. landfilling
4. burning on farm
5. burial on farm

Despite this hierarchy, by the 20 March, only one rendering plant at Widnes had been chosen for the rendering of FMD animal carcasses [36]. In fact, burning or burial on farm have been the most widely used methods.

It has been estimated that the emissions of extremely toxic dioxins in March resulting from the burning of coal slag, railway sleepers etc in carcass pyres was 10-20g.This is 3 to 6 per cent of the UK's total annual dioxin emissions[37]. There are grounds for serious concerns about the pollution impact of burning carcasses. It has also been suggested that the use of open pyres may in fact help to spread the virus[38], although this has not been confirmed.

Friends of the Earth (FOE) consider that first choice for the disposal of culled animals should be the top of the Environment Agency “hierarchy” (rendering) rather than the bottom (burning and burial on farm) which is being used at present.

The Costs of the Outbreak

According to a report produced for the Elm Farm Research Centre, a conservative estimate of the direct cost of the FMD outbreak on the UK food economy is £183 million[39]. The report also notes that the economic benefits of an extended wide cull of animals in infected areas (retaining meat exports, avoiding vaccination costs)are far outweighed by the costs of the cull (compensation, income losses on farms, impacts on tourism). The Farm Retail Association has estimated that farm retail businesses (eg farm shops, farmhouse restaurants) were showing 50 per cent to 90 per cent falls in customer numbers in March and takings were down by £6 million per week[40] Various tourism authorities in the UK have estimated that the overall cost of lack of access to the countryside was running at £270 million per week in March 2001, and that this could rise to £410 million per week by the end of April 2001[41].

Compensation
By April 2001, the UK government had announced the following compensation packages following the FMD outbreak[42, 43, 44]:
* £247 million compensation for slaughtered animals
* £156 million 'agrimonetary' compensation for the

sheep, beef and dairy sectors (over the £15 million compulsory aid)
* £200 million compensation for 'welfare' slaughter of livestock
* £40 million payment of the pig industry restructuring fund brought forward to 2001
* Rates relief for businesses affected by FMD, eg tourism
* Rates relief for small businesses in rural areas affectedby FMD, eg food shops, pubs, garages with a rateable value under £9000.
* Unemployment benefits to people whose ability to work is affected by FMD

In the Netherlands, a 1997 outbreak of swine fever cost in total US$2.3 billion. Out of this, the government and the EU bore 47 per cent of the total losses, farmers bore 28 per cent and related industries 25 per cent[45]. This was despite the fact that compensation payments were in part paid for by a levy on the agricultural industry. As was noted by the Dutch review, the costs of the outbreak were not borne by the industry in which they originated. NFU mutual, the UK's largest supplier of agricultural insurance, has reported that only 10 per cent of farms have insurance policies covering them for an outbreak of foot and mouth disease[46].

In the Netherlands, compensation for livestock epidemics is provided by a government fund which is joint matched by a levy from animal producers[47]. Introduced in 1998, after a series of outbreaks of swine fever, the Animal Health Fund applies to the pig industry and is paid in an annual fee which varies from year to year depending on the levels of disease. The amount a farmer pays depends on how many animal contacts the herd has. So, farmers who breed their own animals and keep them until sending them to market would pay less than a farmer who sends animals out to lots of other farms for fattening up. This practice of moving animals around several times is common in the UK. Similarly, pig farmers in the Netherlands who fail to meet animal health hygiene requirements may receive lower levels of compensation in the event of disease outbreak.

Genetic Diversity
One of the impacts of the increasing intensification of the livestock industry has been a reduction in genetic diversity. A small number of breeds now dominate, (eg Holstein-Friesian cattle; large white pigs) when

previously there were many different, regionally distinct breeds in use. These less common breeds are now reserved to very small herds and many are endangered. The National Trust and the Rare Breeds Survival Trust has expressed concern that the slaughter policy being adopted by the UK government could lead to the destruction of an entire breed if the few surviving animals are culled.
The National Trust has also expressed concern that flocks of 'hefted' sheep, traditional hill breeds which have their own territories learnt over generations, will also be lost. Rare breeds are a vital resource for maintaining the genetic diversity of UK livestock as a whole, and in addition these breeds are often much better adapted to the conditions of particular regions of the UK. Many breeds are also important for the conservation management of farmland.

Friends of the Earth supports all efforts to preserve this genetic diversity, including the strategic use of vaccination to protect these valuable livestock breeds. This would be in line with the historical approach to livestock culls, in which valuable breeding stock or pedigree herds were exempted from slaughter[48].

Trade Impacts
The UK farming exports have already been decimated by previous livestock epidemics. Exports of UK beef have yet to recover from the BSE crisis, despite controls having been lifted. Only a relatively small share of global livestock production goes to international trade - in 1996 beef exports worldwide accounted for only 3 per cent of global production[49]. Trade in pork and poultry products is increasing, while trade in beef products is in decline. This is because of the high cost of transport of meat products as well as health and hygiene regulations. Due to the BSE crisis, only a small amount of beef is exported from the UK - in 2000 this amounted to around 8,600 tonnes of beef, at a value of £24 million.

The UK government has repeatedly expressed concern about the loss of foot and mouth disease free status if vaccination is used. But with the global spread of a disease, as is happening with FMD, the trade benefits are relatively small because of the small number of countries to which this is relevant. The UK export market for meat is the EU, the Middle East, Africa and the Russian
federation states. Of these, only the EU is FMD free without vaccination.

Conversely, a reliance solely upon slaughter could potentially lead to severe effects upon the farming industry because of the effects of depopulation and movement restrictions. Money and time are needed to restock herds, and there is likely to be a loss of markets caused by the negative publicity of the slaughter policy.

Trade restrictions are extended if animals have beenvaccinated. However, the EU Scientific Committee on Animal Health and Animal Welfare has produced an opinion suggesting that tests which can differentiate between animals that have been vaccinated and those which have had FMD could be used to allow trade restrictions to be lifted, allowing export of animals to the EU[50] . Discussions which would approve the use of such tests at an international level are also ongoing.

Conclusion

Numerous warnings were issued in the last three years that Europe was at a high risk of contracting FMD. Despite these warnings, there seems to be very little action taken by either the UK Government or those representing farmers such as the NFU. The large scale of animal movements coupled with the high density of livestock were seen to contribute to the high risk but no steps have been taken to reduce them.

It is unclear whether the current “stamping out” policy is the most effective method of controlling FMD. The Government has permission to use vaccination on cattle and pigs in Cumbria and Devon but has refused to do so or to clearly explain why. Eight and a half million doses of vaccine exist but there has been no action to vaccinate rare breeds or valuable pedigree stock. If FMD continues to spread and MAFF continue in their “stamping out” policy then the genetic diversity of breeds will be seriously threatened.

The financial costs of FMD are likely to be high and are likely to be borne mainly by the taxpayer. Despite numerous warnings about the increasing risk of FMD arriving in the UK only a small number of farmers had taken out insurance. Serious questions must be asked about what advice has been given to farmers by both the Government and the NFU.

Friends of the Earth's position
Friends of the Earth considers that there should be a full public inquiry into the cause, consequences and management of the foot and mouth crisis, as called for by Environment Minister Michael Meacher.

In addition, there should be a full public review of the reforms required to make agriculture and food production a sustainable industry resulting in a White Paper in 2002 at the latest. MAFF has already shown itself incapable of managing policy in a way thatencourages sustainable farming practices and FOE believes that major restructuring is required to ensure that such practices are properly encouraged in future.

FOE believes that to protect genetic diversity the Government should seriously consider the use of vaccination for rare breeds and important pedigree breeds. FOE urges the Government to publish all advice it has received on vaccination and explain why is has not proceeded to protect animals in Cumbria and Devon when it has EU permission to do so.

References
[1]Woods, A, 2001. Foot and Mouth disease: an evaluation of the current control policy from a historical perspective Elm Farm Research Centre
[2]NJ Knowles, AR Samuels, 1998. Molecular techniques in foot-and-mouth disease epidemiology in Towards livestock disease diagnosis and control in the 21st century: proceedings of an International symposium, Vienna 1997. IAEA, Vienna 1998
[3]FAO, 2000. “A pandemic strain of foot and mouth disease virus serotype O (FMDV-O), named Pan-Asia, has recently been identified” EMPRES Trans boundary animal diseases bulletin No 14/2 - FMD
[4]Report from the OIE/ FAO World Reference Laboratory for Foot- and- Mouth Disease (WRLFMD)
Virus strain identification for the years 2000- 2001. 15 March 2001
[5]FAO, 2000. “A pandemic strain of foot and mouth disease virus serotype O (FMDV-O), named Pan-Asia, has recently been identified” EMPRES Trans boundary animal diseases bulletin No 14/2 - FMD
[6]MAFF. Foot and Mouth Disease: Important update for sheep farmers - Clinical signs of foot and mouth in sheep 7 March 2001
[7]AVIS, 2001. Foot and Mouth Disease, an overview: Transmission. http://aleffgroup.com/avisfmd/A010-fmd/mod0/0221-transm ission.html
[8]Callis, J.J. 1980. Foot-and-mouth disease in cattle - some relationships between pathogenesis and
epizootiology. Bovine Practitioner, November 1980, pg. 164- 168; Sutmoller, P.; Cottral, G.E. and McVicar, J.W. 1968. A review of the carrier state in foot-and-mouth disease. Proceedings of the 71st annual meeting of the U.S. Livestock Sanitary Association, October 16-20, 1967, Phoenix AZ, pg. 386-395.
[9]USDA:APHIS , 1994. Foot-and-Mouth Disease: Sources of Outbreaks and Hazard Categorization of Modes of Virus Transmission Centers for Epidemiology and Animal Health 555 South Howes, Suite 200
Fort Collins, Colorado 80521
[10]Report from the Commission to the Council on a studycarried out by the Commission on policies currently applied by Member States in the control of Foot and Mouth disease. 1989. SEC (89) 1731 final
[11]USDA:APHIS:VS, 1994. Foot and Mouth disease: sources of outbreaks and hazard categorisation of modes of virus transmission Centres for Epidemiology and Animal Health, Fort Collins, Colorado
[12]USDA:APHIS , 1994. Foot-and-Mouth Disease: Sources of Outbreaks and Hazard Categorization of Modes of Virus Transmission Centers for Epidemiology and Animal Health 555 South Howes, Suite 200 Fort Collins, Colorado 80521
[13]UNFAO Europe vulnerable to livestock epidemics, warning delivered at FAO press conference 27 February 1998
[14]Marabelli, R, Ferri G, Bellini S, 1999. Management of animal health emergencies: general principles and legal and international obligations Rev sci Tech Off Int Epiz 18(1) 21-29
[15]J Leslie, M Upton, 1999. The economic implications of greater global trade in livestock and livestock products Rev Sci Tech Off Int Epiz 18(2) 440-457
[16]Hugh-Jones, M.E., and P.B.Wright. 1970. Studies on the 1967-8 foot and mouth disease epidemic: The relation of weather to the spread of disease. J.Hyg.Camb. 68, 253-71.
[17]Casal, J., J.M. Moreso, E.Planas-Cuchí, and J.Casal. 1997. Simulated airborne spread of Aujeszky's disease and foot and mouth disease. Vet.Rec. 140, 672-6.
[18]Horst HS et al, 1999. The involvement of the agriculture industry and government in animal disease emergencies and the funding of compensation in western Europe Rev sci Tech Off Int Epiz 18(1) 30-37
[19]MAFF 2001. Foot and mouth disease: source of outbreak
[20]Woods, A, 2001. Foot and Mouth disease: an evaluation of the current control policy from a historical perspective Elm Farm Research Centre
[21]Horst HS et al, 1999. The economic evaluation of control and eradication of epidemic livestock diseases Rev sci Tech Off Int Epiz 18(2) 367-379
[22]Horst HS et al, 1999. The involvement of the agriculture industry and government in animal disease emergencies and
the funding of compensation in western Europe Rev sci Tech Off Int Epiz 18(1) 30-37
[23]Speech by Nick Brown, Agriculture Minister, to the House of Commons, 9 April 2001.
[24]Small and Family Farmers Alliance, Press Release. Call for a change to a vaccination policy to control foot and mouth 26 March 2001.
[25]Woods, A, 2001. Foot and Mouth disease: an evaluation of the current control policy from a historical perspective Elm Farm Research Centre
[26]RSPCA News. Concern over license delays 6 April 2001
[27]Written Answer from MAFF to the House of Commons, 4 April 2001. House of Commons Hansard Col 220W
[28]European Commission DG XXIV. FMD: General commitment not to re-introduce vaccination by member statesBrussels, 23 March 2001
[29]AVIS, 2001. Foot and Mouth Disease. Disease Eradication/Prevention. Emergency 'ring' vaccination http://aleffgroup.com/avisfmd/A010-fmd/mod4/4360-ring-v accination.html
[30]OFFICIALS STRUGGLED TO CONTAIN SIMULATION March 16, 2001 National Post/CP
[31]Leforban Y, 2000. “Foot and Mouth Disease: Workshop on the Non-structural protein ELISA test” EMPRES Transboundary Animal Diseases Bulletin No 13
[32]Scientific Committee on Animal Health and Animal Welfare Strategy for Emergency Vaccination against Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) adopted 10 March 1999
[33]European Commission, 19 March 2001. Foot-and-mouth disease: questions and answers on vaccination policy of the EU
[34]European Commission DG XXIV FMD: SVC agrees to UK contingency plan Brussels, 28 March 2001
[35]Environment Agency, 2001. Foot and Mouth Disease
control: the role of the Environment Agency of England and Wales
March 2001/Ref01
[36]Written Answer to the House of Commons by MAFF. 20
March 2001. House of Commons Hansard 194W
[37]Written Answer to the house of Commons by Michael Meacher. 26 March 2001. Hansard Col 430W[38]AVIS, 2001. Foot and Mouth Disease, an overview: production of virus. http://aleffgroup.com/avisfmd/A010-fmd/mod0/0221-wind- production.html
[39]Midmore, P, 2001. The 2001 Foot and Mouth Outbreak: Economic Arguments against an extended cull Elm Farm Research Centre, 26 March 2001
[40]Farm retail association. Farm Retail Incomes 'down by £6 million per week' in foot and mouth outbreak News Release March 2001.
[41]Financial Times, 14 March 2001.
[42]Mr Paul Murphy. Commons Written Answer 4 April 2001. Hansard Col 255W
[43]Statement by Agriculture Minister Nick Brown to the House of Commons, 27 March 2001
[44]Statement by Agriculture Minister Nick Brown to the House of Commons, 9 April 2001
[45]Horst HS et al, 1999. The economic evaluation of control and eradication of epidemic livestock diseases Rev sci Tech Off Int Epiz 18(2) 367-379
[46]Ms Quin. Commons Written Answer 26 March 2001. House of Commons Hansard Col 517W
[47]Horst HS et al, 1999. The involvement of the agriculture industry and government in animal disease emergencies and the funding of compensation in western Europe Rev sci Tech Off Int Epiz 18(1) 30-37
[48]Woods, A, 2001. Foot and Mouth disease: an evaluation of the current control policy from a historical perspective Elm Farm Research Centre
[49]J Leslie, M Upton, 1999. The economic implications of greater global trade in livestock and livestock products Rev Sci Tech Off Int Epiz 18(2) 440-457
[50]Scientific Committee on Animal Health and Animal Welfare Strategy for Emergency Vaccination against Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) adopted 10 March 1999


Friends of the Earth
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E-mail:        info@foe.co.uk
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April 2001
Author: Emily Diamand
Last Modified: 19 April 2001

Printed on paper 100 per cent recycled from post-consumer waste