No one expected the Kyoto climate summit to achieve miracles but the outcome confirmed our worst fears, namely that governments (especially the US) continue to pander to industry at the expense of the environment. The Kyoto protocol has a pitifully low target of a 5.2% reduction from 1990 levels, a delayed timetable (2008 2012), provisions for emissions trading and joint implementation, and contains various other loopholes. As a result, the 5.2% reduction is far from assured and under worst case scenarios, emissions could actually increase.
Basically, the US mostly got its way, with significant concessions having been made by the EU. The inclusion of the US as the largest and mightiest of the historical polluters has been vital to these talks and this is the price that the EU and AOSIS (Alliance of Small Island States) countries have paid to keep the Clinton administration on board. At least the US increased its initial stabilisation target to a 7% reduction. Yet, ratification by the US senate is far from assured.
Lobbying by Friends of the Earth and other NGOs prevented an even worse outcome and not all is lost. Details of trading, joint implementation and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) will not actually be settled until the next Conference of the Parties (COP 4) in Buenos Aires in November 1998. The issue of developing countries participation also remains unresolved. Also, as a number of announcements from companies such as Chrysler, Ford and General Motors since Kyoto have demonstrated, industry is beginning to wake up to the fact that businessasusual is no longer acceptable as far as greenhouse gas emissions are concerned.
***The text of the Kyoto protocol (FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add.1) can be found on the climate secretariat's website: www.unfccc.de***
Overall, the negotiators appear to have settled for higher targets from some of the key countries (i.e. US, Canada and Japan) in return for bigger loopholes. It is not possible to make a firm assessment what this means in terms of real emissions for individual countries, as much will depend on the trading system to be developed, as well as the reporting of sinks. Reductions have to be achieved by the commitment period 2008 to 2012, although demonstrable progress will have to be made by 2005. However, this early target date is not legally enforceable.
Most Annex 1 countries have been given a 8% reduction target for 2008 to 2012, although a number of key countries have weaker targets. Overall, the differentiated targets add up to a reduction of 5.2% by 2012. This is totally inadequate if one considers the 60% reduction needed by the middle of the next century to stabilise atmospheric concentrations at a level which would avoid dangerous climate change. Even worse, as some countries (especiallyRussia and the Ukraine) are likely to have emissions well below their target, trading means that overall emissions could even increase.
Russia and the Ukraine have managed to secure themselves a stabilisation target, which means they have to do nothing at all to limit emissions in this budget period and they will have plenty of spare emissions to trade. Effectively, the two countries with the largest overall emission reductions since 1990 have been given some of the weakest targets. Greenhouse gas emissions in these two countries are currently more than 30% below their 1990 level and projections indicate that by 2010 they could still be up to be 20% below their 1990 level. Central and Eastern European countries will also have some emissions available for trading. As these countries together account for large overall emission volumes, there would be enough spare emissions to cover a 6% reduction (on 1990 levels) from all the other Annex 1 countries. Furthermore, the protocol allows the banking of emission reductions, i.e. they can be added to the next budget period. This means that whatever emissions Russia and the Ukraine cannot trade this time, they can simply add them to the next budget period and sell the tons then.
The protocol also allows some countries a direct increase of emissions. The 8% increase forAustralia, which sports the OECD's second highest per capita emissions, sets a very bad precedent. The Australian government has been one of the most obstructive in the negotiations, a strategy which has obviously paid off for them. The allowed increased of 10% for Iceland and 1% for Norway are somewhat more acceptable as both countries have low emissions on a unit of GDP basis and have a high percentage contribution from renewables in energy supply.
Despite all these weaknesses, the protocol (if properly implemented) will not allow total inaction. In the majority of Annex 1 countries, emissions are already exceeding 1990 levels and projections for post2000 are for even faster growth. The US Department of Energy has projected US CO2 emissions to increase by 34% by 2010. Hence, action will be needed toreverse this trend in emissions growth
Friends of the Earth has always argued that all greenhouse gases need to be covered by the protocol. The 3 F gases (HFCs, PFCs and SF6) are extremely potent and emissions are growing fast. However, the bundling together of all six greenhouse gases in a basket is far from ideal, in particular as there are large uncertainties regarding the emissions of CH4 andN2O. A gasbygas approach would have been preferable, with a eventual phase out for the F gases. Instead, they were given a 1995 baseline and inclusion in the basket potentially allows considerable increases. When the protocol is reviewed in a few years times, a strong case for a phaseout of these gases needs to be made
COP 4 is to decide on the trading mechanism (rules, modalities etc). The text of the protocol states that 'such trading shall be supplemental to domestic actions' but currently there is no specific cap on trading. During the negotiations, a number of possible caps were mentioned (the US was supposedly prepared to go for a 50% cap) but no agreement could be reached. A number of EU and developing countries had outright opposition to trading (mainly as it was perceived as letting the US off the hook ) but it is clear that the US was not prepared to signthe protocol without trading provisions
Sinks are included in the protocol (net changes in afforestation, reforestation and deforestation), supposedly verifiable changes only. Data on the level of carbon stock in 1990 is to be provided to SBSTA (Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technical Advice) prior to the first Meeting of the Parties (MOP, i.e. the first COP after entry into force). That MOP can also decide on additional sink categories, such as managed forests, agricultural soils. Japan for example is hoping to achieve 3.4% of its 6% reduction target through sinks, including the expansion of sink categories. The inclusion of further sink categories is highly problematic, especially where their definition is ambiguous.
Review time periods are vague the protocol states that the first review should be at the second MOP (i.e. 2 or 3 years after entry into force, may be 2002/3), further reviews in 'at regular intervals and in a timely manner'. NGOs lobbied for reviews every 3 to 5 years. While initial protocol drafts included a review of the 'adequacy of commitments', this is absent from the actual protocol.
This is a provision for a joint implementation style mechanism but it will not be based on the result of the evaluation of the AIJ (activities implemented jointly) pilot phase. Again, there is no cap and how much Annex 1 countries could achieving through the CDM and crediting. Hence, there is a danger that this could be a cheap way out of taking domestic action, although the US in particular
The decision on the compliance mechanism has been deferred to the first MOP. Obviously, without an adequate compliance mechanism there is a danger that Parties will flaunt the provisions of the protocol and fail to achieve their reduction targets.
It requires ratification from 55 Parties, accounting for at least 55% of the total CO2 emissions for 1990 for the protocol to enter into force, i.e. could be blocked by the US, Japan and the EU together.
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1997
Climate campaign
